Abstract-In the realm of cyber security, recent events have demonstrated the need for a significant change in the philosophies guiding the identification and mitigation of attacks. The unprecedented increase in the quantity and sophistication of cyber attacks in the past year alone has proven the inadequacy of current defensive philosophies that do not assume continuous compromise. This has given rise to new perspectives on cyber defense where, instead of total prevention, threat intelligence is the crucial tool allowing the mitigation of cyber threats. This paper formalizes a new framework for obtaining threat intelligence from an active cyber attack and demonstrates the realization of this framework in the software tool, LinkShop. Specifically, using the behavioral analysis technique known as linkography, our framework allows cyber defenders to, in an automated fashion, quantitatively capture both general and nuanced patterns in attacker's behavior -pushing capabilities for generating threat intelligence far beyond what is currently possible with rudimentary indicators of compromise and into the realm of capability needed to combat future cyber attackers. Furthermore, this paper shows in detail how such knowledge can be achieved by using LinkShop on actual cyber event data and lays a foundation for further scientific investigation into cyber attacker behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, which has been called the "Year of the Mega Breach", there was a 91% increase in the the number of targeted attack campaigns, a 62% increase in the number of breaches, and a 23% increase in the number of web-based attacks over the previous year [1] . The number and severity of attacks will continue to rise as more devices and users are added to the networks [1] , [2] .
The increase in quantity, sophistication, and damage caused by these attacks requires a new way of approaching defensive techniques. Rather than believing every attack can be prevented, the most effective organizations now operate under the expectation of continuous compromise [3] . In this environment, threat intelligence (knowledge of tactics, techniques, and protocols used by an adversary) makes the difference between a mitigated attack and a front page story. Unfortunately, threat intelligence is often summarized as simple indicators/artifacts of compromise (e.g., language settings, compilation paths, IP addresses, etc.) that have been used by adversaries or are representative of common malware.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for unlimited release: SAND2015-1976 C This paper switches the focus from artifacts to the more fundamental question: can we characterize, or even anticipate, adversary behavior? It has been shown understanding behavior and subsequently decreasing the intelligibility of the operating environment greatly influences how individuals behave [4] , [5] . While there have been attempts at examining attack behaviors from system activity [6] , [7] or gauging the capabilities of cyber attackers [8] , these are predominantly manual and qualitative in nature. There remains a significant opportunity to use actual data from attacks to model cyber behavior. Without automated tools, these analyses will only become increasingly difficult for the cyber defender as the amount of data to be examined continues to increase at super-linear rates [9] .
To address these issues, we create a framework for the quantitative analysis of attackers and attack patterns based on linkography. Linkography is a method for representing a process as a linkograph. A linkograph displays the interactions between a series of temporally related actions and events. These representations have proven useful for understanding areas such as the creativity of a design process [10] , analyzing dialog during collaboration [11] , [12] , and constructing models of human behavior in retail stores [5] . Linkography was first proposed by Goldschmidt [13] as a method to understand the design process. The linkographs were used to document how designers thought and generated ideas, thus adding the ability to quantitatively compare different design sessions, which had previously been a qualitative process. Given the foundation of linkographs, other research looked at how to compare and contrast given linkographs. Goldschmidt [14] introduced the idea of forelinks and backlinks to understand how steps in the design process influence one another. Kan and Gero [15] and Kan et al. [11] studied the Shannon entropy for linkographs, demonstrating those with higher entropy generated more design ideas (i.e., more novel solutions). Kan and Gero [12] , [16] developed further statistical methods to analyze portions of a linkograph to draw conclusions about the entire linkograph, which were incorporated into a graphic analysis tool [17] .
Using linkographs, we focus on examining adversary behavior patterns observed during a cyber attack, which leads to understanding the motivation and intent of the attacker. By mathematically analyzing the graph structures using various measures such as Shannon entropy [18] , we are able to compare attacks, attack patterns, and in the end, attackers. This allows us to posit answers to questions such as how knowledgeable an attacker is of the target system and/or if the attacker has previously attacked the system. This enhanced understanding of the attacks opens up the possibility for educated placement of false cues that can directly impact the adversary's ability to accomplish his or her mission goals.
Our work differs from previous research in three primary aspects. First, we apply the linkography method, analysis techniques, and lessons learned to a novel domain, namely cyber security. Many of the conclusions drawn previously are based on different assumptions from architectural design and cognitive processes, requiring careful analysis and exploration in this new domain. Secondly, we demonstrate how the creation and analysis of linkographs, previously primarily a manual process, can be automated. Finally, we provide the ability to use a variety of data sources and data abstraction techniques in our linkograph construction. Our contributions include:
• A formalized, mathematical definition of a linkograph and proofs of basic linkograph properties.
• A framework for the automatic generation of linkographs from raw cyber data. This includes an abstraction model used to examine and aggregate actions taken by the attacker and an ontological model that describes the general form and flow of a cyber attack.
• A demonstration of how linkography can be used to analyze the behavior of an attacker and draw subsequent conclusions from this behavior.
• An example of how the linkographs can be used to inform the placement of a special type of honeytoken we call a honeycue. The primary purpose behind honeycues is to influence subsequent actions performed by an attacker, thereby delaying or disrupting an attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We formally define linkographs and linkograph metrics in Section II, describe our analysis framework in Section III, analyze an exemplar dataset in detail in Section IV, discuss honeycue placement in Section V, and conclude our work in Section VI.
II. LINKOGRAPHY
As noted in Section I, linkography is a method of representing a series of events in order to draw deeper understanding about the intent behind the events. In this section, we provide a formal framework for describing the primary tool of linkography, the linkograph, as well as describe the set of metrics we use as part of our analysis of cyber events.
A. Linkographs
A linkograph such as the one depicted in Figure 1 is an undirected graph that displays the interactions between actions in an event 1 . Formally, each action is represented as a leaf node, which is given a natural number index n ∈ N <n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, node 0 occurred before node 1, and so forth. A link is a pair of nodes (i, j) such that i < j and indicates a relationship between two nodes i and j. Given a link (i, j), the node i is called a backlink of node j and j is a called a forelink of node i. A backlink can be thought 1 Although the temporal component suggests a direction to the edge, relations to both past and future actions are considered. Thus, it is more straightforward to consider the connection undirected and let context determine the direction. of as a record of the path that led to the generation of a action/node while a forelink bears evidence of a contribution to the production of further actions/nodes. Given the definition of both a node and link, we are able to formally define a linkograph as follows:
Formally, the linkograph on six nodes seen in Figure 1 is given by:
The numerically labeled nodes are the performed actions and the unlabeled nodes are the links.
In addition to linkographs as a whole, sub-linkographs play a pivotal role in analysis. Let SL(a, b) be the linkograph formed by only considering the links between nodes a through b. For example, the subgraph SL(0, 3) for the linkograph in Figure 1 is given by the following links:
Visually, SL(0, 3) is the larger triangle of nodes and links highlighted in Figure 1 .
Given the general definition of a linkograph, when calculating metrics over them, it is often important to know the possible number of linkographs on a set of n nodes. Let M n be the number of possible links on n nodes. The following theorem establishes the number of possible links:
Theorem 1 (Possible Links). Let L be a linkograph on n nodes, then the number of possible links is:
Proof: When n = 0 or 1,
is 0, which agrees with the set of possible links since the set {(i, j) | 0 ≤ i < j < n} is empty in both cases.
Suppose n > 1. Then the number of possible links is in bijective correspondence with the number of 2-subsets of N <n , that is, the set S 2 = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N <n and i = j} 2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS) has the same cardinality as M n . Since the cardinality of N <n is n, the cardinality of S 2 is
where n m is the binomial coefficient n choose m. Once the number of possible links is known, the number of possible linkographs is easy to obtain, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 2 (Cardinality of Distinct Linkographs). The number of distinct linkographs on n nodes is 2 n .
Proof: Every linkograph, L, on n nodes is a subset of M n , the set of possible links for n nodes. Thus, the number of distinct linkographs is same as the cardinality of the powerset of M n . Since the cardinality of M n is n by Theorem 1, the cardinality of the powerset is 2 n .
B. Metrics
In order to quantitatively analyze a linkograph and draw comparisons between multiple linkographs, we study four metrics:
Each of the metrics is explained in further detail below.
The PercentageOfLinks(lBound, uBound) is the ratio of links present versus the total possible links for the sublinkograph, SL(lBound, uBound). For example, in Figure 1 , PercentageOfLinks(0, 3) = The metric PercentClass(abs class) is the ratio of nodes that belong to an abstract class abs class to the total nodes in the linkograph. Different classes of nodes are explained in further detail in Section III.
The metric BackLinkPercent(node) gives the ratio of backlinks present for the given node versus the total possible backlinks. For node 3 of Figure 1 , BackLinkPercent(3) = 1 3 since only one of the possible three backlinks is present.
The final metric, ShannonEntropy(lBound, uBound) calculates the Shannon entropy for the sub-linkograph SL(lBound, uBound) via Kan and Gero's Shannon entropy formula [15] :
where p linked is the ratio of links to the total number of possible links and p unlinked is the ratio of links not present to the total number of links. The value of ShannonEntropy(0, 3) for Figure 1 is calculated as follows:
In the extreme cases when p linked = 0, p linked = 1, p unlinked = 0, or p unlinked = 1, the Shannon entropy is defined to be 0.
Although the Shannon entropy is defined in terms of two variables p linked and p unlinked , they are related by p unlinked = 1 − p linked . Thus, H can be written as
Many important facts about Shannon entropy can be obtained by considering H as a function on [0, 1] and not just as a function on the ratios of links, which only consists of a finite number of points. Accordingly, we define the function f H : [0, 1] → R by:
The following theorem establishes some basic facts about f H .
Then f H is continuous and
Furthermore, f H is maximized when x = 1 2 and is minimized when x = 0 or 1, corresponding to statements by Kan and Gero [12] .
Proof: Since x, (1−x), log 2 (x), and log 2 (1−x) are continuous on (0, 1), f H (x) is continuous on (0, 1). To establish continuity at 0, first note that by L'Hopital's rule:
Using basic limit laws and the continuity of (1−x) log 2 (1−x), we obtain
Continuity at 1 is established in a similar manner.
Since f H is continuous on [0, 1], the Extreme Value Theorem implies that f H is bounded. Moreover, since the functions x, (1 − x), log 2 (x) and log 2 (1 − x) are all differentiable on (0, 1), the extreme values occur at 0, 1, or when f H (x) = 0.
. So, the maximum value is 1 and the minimum value is 0, since f H (0) = f H (1) = 0 and f H ( The fact that f H (x) is continuous at 0 and 1 provides a justification for defining the Shannon entropy, H, to be 0 when p linked = 0 or 1. Indeed, if we let p l n = l n where l is the number of links and n the total number of links, then, for a fixed l, lim n→∞ p l n = 0. Thus, there are linkographs where p is arbitrarily close to 0, so it is natural to define H(0) to be the limit lim x→0 + H(0), which exists and is 0 by Theorem 3.
The theory matches our intuition: the Shannon entropy is lowest when the linkograph has either no links or all potential links. The highest Shannon entropy is found in linkographs where half of all potential links have been made.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
We have created a framework called LinkShop, which allows for the quantitative analysis of attack patterns and attackers. LinkShop is composed of a pipeline of modules that allow an analyst to construct linkographs from event data associated with a cyber attack and quantitatively assess the patterns of an attacker's behavior encoded in these structures. This pipeline is shown in Figure 2 . The primary input to LinkShop is one or more sets of security event data captured during a cyber intrusion. The final output of the pipeline is a set of linkographs and metrics for assessing the behavior of the attacker and providing information regarding optimal honeycue placement.
In addition to the captured commands, secondary inputs to the system include a set of abstraction classes and an ontology, which allow an analyst to configure how a linkograph is produced from the raw data. The abstraction classes are used to determine how raw strings of event data are interpreted and aggregated into sets sharing common characteristics. An example set of classes is formulated in Listing 1. To date, we have focused our efforts on Microsoft Windows shell commands, but the framework can be extended to support any command and control activity by modifying the abstraction classes. The ontology defines how abstract classes of behavior Look:
Transfer:
Move: relate and link to one another and, in some sense, quantifies an informed hypothesis about the behaviors during an attack. This hypothesis determines which links are formed between which nodes in a linkograph. Two prototypical ontologies are presented in Figure 3 . The ontology in Figure 3 (a) exclusively contains self-loops, which helps to highlight the prevalence of commands in sections of the data. Figure 3 (b) presents an ontology where the links formed between nodes represent forward progress. This is captured by the fact there are no self-loops (e.g., Looks are not linked together), highlighting transitions between activities and patterns. The presence of these analyst-specified inputs emphasizes the fact LinkShop constitutes a system for aiding an analyst in quantitatively assessing adversary behavior. Different behaviors can be highlighted depending on how the abstraction classes are generated and how they are linked using the ontology.
Data can be obtained in a variety of manners, including
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extracting it from the network traffic associated with Remote Administration Tools (RATs) often used by attackers. Once the commands have been extracted, LinkShop expects them to be formatted into JSON objects with members that correspond to the full string for the command, including arguments, and the date and time when it was executed. Each command string is Base64 encoded to preserve the exact structure and content of the extracted command.
Due to the potentially sensitive nature of information contained within the raw commands used by an attacker, the first module within LinkShop provides an analyst with the ability to automatically anonymize the original commands. Data such as actual file names, IP addresses, and password hashes are replaced with pseudorandom values. The structure and semantics of the commands are preserved while performing this replacement. This includes details such as replacing the actual file paths with nonexistent paths of the same length, maintaining the actual name of the command within each command string, and anonymizing identical structures to the same value. The preservation of structure and command name allows LinkShop's production of a linkograph from a particular set of data to remain deterministic under anonymization. Although LinkShop does not currently use the date/time information, all timestamps are perturbed by an identical value. The first module within LinkShop also enables an analyst to encrypt the original set of commands with the AES-256 for secure storage.
The second LinkShop module handles classifying the commands according to the abstract classes of attacker behavior. The classification is defined by a set of analyst defined abstraction rule classes, such as those in Listing 1. At a strictly functional level, each of the classes consists of a set of regular expressions compared against a command and associated arguments. If the command matches an expression, it is assigned the label of the corresponding abstraction class. At a higher level, each abstraction class corresponds to a type of behavior and the associated expressions are used to recognize commands that exhibit that behavior. For example, from Listing 1, the abstraction class of Look can be thought of as corresponding to the set of behaviors characteristic of an attacker "looking around" a vulnerable system from multiple vantage points (e.g., file system, network, etc.). An analyst may specify a "default" abstraction class that is assigned to any shell command that does not match a rule -otherwise, such commands are omitted in analyses provided by LinkShop.
The third module in LinkShop takes the chronological sequence of abstraction class labels assigned to the commands and creates connections between elements in the sequence to form a linkograph. These connections are formed according to the ontology provided by an analyst. If the ontology defines a relation A → B between two abstraction classes A and B, then a link (i, j) is created whenever i is assigned the abstraction class A and j is assigned B. For example, if the second command is assigned to Look, and the fourth command is assigned to Execute, then the link (2, 4) is created using the ontology in Figure 3(b) .
The addition of the secondary inputs to the system gives LinkShop greater utility than just a specific functional model that might be used to assess an attacker's behavior, such as a Listing 2. Listing of the anonymized GrrCON commands and subsequent abstraction class labels generated using the abstraction classes in Listing 1
Markov Chain. With LinkShop, an analyst is free to investigate different possible models of behavior by incorporating various ontologies and many different realizations of that behavior for a given dataset via different abstraction rules. Each realization of the behavior specified by a given model is then mapped to a common element, the linkograph, across which standardized methods of analysis can be applied. This architecture generalizes the construction of linkographs beyond the specific model for design-conversations initially proposed by Goldschmidt [13] and into the realm where different models of behavior, such as Obrst's ontology [19] , can be utilized.
After a linkograph has been constructed from the data, the final module in LinkShop provides an analyst with a suite of methods for analyzing the linkograph's structure based on the metrics in Section II-B. As is demonstrated in Section IV, the structure highlighted by these measures corresponds to patterns in the behavior of the attacker. Identification of these patterns can then inform where an analyst should place a honeycue in the path of an attacker to influence his or her next move. Initially, honeycue placement will be a posteriori, but we envision future work will make real-time placement possible.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the utility of LinkShop through the analysis of an open source attack dataset presented at the 2012 GrrCON Conference. The 2012 GrrCON Network Forensic Challenge was created to present the type of forensic artifacts available to an analyst in the event of a targeted cyber attack [20] . Since the challenge included both a memory image of the compromised system and a network packet capture with commands typed by the fictitious attacker, it makes an ideal dataset for our initial use of LinkShop.
A. Linkograph Creation
Before performing any analysis, we use the first module in LinkShop (see Figure 2 ) to anonymize the GrrCON data and obtain the commands in Listing 2. The input to this module is data in the JSON format described previously, which can be created manually or via a tool such as ChopShop [21] . Passing the abstraction classes in Listing 1 to LinkShop together with the commands, we obtain the abstraction class labels shown to the right of the commands in Listing 2. It should be noted commands belong to at least one class, but may belong to more depending on their functionality. Once the commands are labeled according to the abstraction classes, the final step in creating the linkograph is to formulate the ontology that describes the relationships between classes. We use the selfloop ontology in Figure 3 (a) to together with the abstraction class labels to obtain the linkograph in Figure 4 .
B. Linkograph Analysis
By using self-loops, the linkograph becomes a graphical representation of the percentage of commands of a given class in a given area. For example, the sub-linkograph SL(1, 4) is maximally linked, which directly corresponds to every command belonging to the same class. By following the maximally linked sub-linkographs, one visually picks out the sub-linkographs SL (1, 4) , SL(5, 7), SL (8, 11) , SL(12, 13), SL (14, 15) , SL (16, 18) , and SL (20, 22) . These sub-linkographs correspond to the sequence of classes: Look, Move, Look, Transfer, Look, Execute, and finally Cleanup. This sequence is useful since it tells a story of how the attacker progressed through the system. In addition to identifying this sequence of sub-linkographs visually, we can algorithmically determine such sequences by considering the percentage of linked nodes versus the total number of possible links for a given sublinkograph. Using the PercentageOfLinks metric, the above sequence of classes can be recreated as the sequence of maximal sub-linkographs SL(a, b) such that the PercentageOfLinks(a, b) = 1.0. For example, SL(1, 4) would be identified as PercentageOfLinks(1, 4) = 1.0 since all of the commands are of the abstract class Look and are thus all linked. Being able to quickly find sets of similar commands and transitions between them allows an analyst to better understand the steps performed in an attack.
Another useful metric for analyzing the linkograph in Figure 4 is PercentClass, which can be used to determine the percentage of time the attacker spent in a particular activity. The value of PercentClass for each abstraction class is shown in Table I . The most common action performed by the attacker was Look, accounting for almost half of all of the commands. The next is Execute, consisting of approximately 17% of the commands. Interestingly, there are a relatively low number of commands for moving about in the system. Based on the PercentClass metric, which indicated a large number of commands dealt with looking around and understanding the system environment, we want to analyze this behavior further. Towards this end, we make the initial hypothesis that since we saw minimal movement by the attacker, the attacker is not running 'dir' commands with arguments (i.e., paths). This would imply the majority of the looking around is due to remote commands such as 'ping' and 'net view'. Using the power of LinkShop, all we need to do to test our hypothesis is update the abstraction classes we pass in as part of the pipeline to account for this behavior. We simply partition the Look class into two separate classes: one looking at the net (LNet) and one looking at the local file structure (LSystem) to obtain the classes in Listing 3. All other abstraction classes are left unmodified. Using these abstraction classes, we obtain the linkograph in Figure 5(a) .
From the linkograph and the PercentClass metric, we find the attacker uses almost double the number of LSystem commands (30.43%) as LNet commands (17.39%), disproving our initial hypothesis. A greater proportion of the commands were dedicated to exploring the local file system in order to identify locations of interest as opposed to understanding the network. In fact, it is easily seen from Figure 5 of the 'dir' commands shown in Listing 2 are called with arguments. This allowed the attacker to examine the local system while remaining in a single directory. To have the linkographs expose such an activity, we simply partition the 'dir' rule of LSystem in a way that takes into account the arguments, as is seen in Listing 4. The classes LDir0 -LDir4 divide the rules from LSystem into sets with arguments of differing directory depths. From Figure 5 (b), we can quickly see related activities from the links (11, 14) and (15, 19) , where related directory information is verified. As an analyst, this would indicate the interleaved actions (i.e., 12-13, 16-18) affected the directory and machine state, making them candidates for closer inspection. While this may seem like a conclusion that is trivial to spot visually, this becomes difficult as the number of commands increases. Thus, the ability to use the metrics to quantify the locations of interest and guide the creation of multiple linkographs is critically important.
C. Using Different Ontologies
All the previous linkographs were constructed using an ontology of self-loops that helped to capture groupings of events. Another ontology shown in Figure 3(b) is built with the idea of capturing forward progress. Progress is made when the system is modified. In terms of the abstraction classes in Listing 1, progress is when a Look is followed by a Move, Transfer, or Execute. Additional Moves, Transfers, or Executes are also signs of progress, as is the Cleanup after system modifications. Strings of similar steps (e.g., MoveMove or Transfer-Transfer) are not considered progress as they could have been collapsed by an advanced attacker into a single step. The resulting linkograph constructed from the ontology in Figure 3 (b) and the abstraction classes from Listing 1 is shown in Figure 5 (c).
With this linkograph, the density of links is no longer directly related to the number of commands belonging to the same class, since self-loops have been eliminated. Rather, the density of links is related to how actions are connected to a set of previous actions. As defined in Section II, for a given link (i, j), node i is the backlink. By considering the types of commands that led to a particular node, we can begin to understand how previous actions give rise to a particular action. For example, we examine the backlinks for the SL(5, 7) in Figure 5 (c). This set of nodes is a direct result of the relation Look → Move and (to a lesser extent) Access, Execute → Move. Thus, the SL(5, 7) is a visual representation of how a set of Look commands precipitated action by the attacker in the form of several Move commands.
Two similar sub-linkographs are present in Figure 5 (c): one formed by the set backlinks for nodes 12 and 13, and one formed by the set of backlinks for nodes 16, 17, and 18. The first of these two sub-linkographs, SL(12, 13) is due to the relations Move → Transfer and Look → Move. As a result, SL(12, 13) is a visual representation of how Look and Move commands resulted in a set of Transfer commands. SL (16, 18) , on the other hand, is due to the relations Look → Execute, Move → Execute, and Transfer → Execute. Thus, SL (16, 18) visually shows how the set of Execute commands precipitated from the exploration (e.g., Look, Move) and preparation (e.g., Transfer) by the attacker. 
ALL SUB-LINKOGRAPHS OF FIGURE 5(C) WITH AT LEAST THREE NODES WITH
Collectively, these three sub-linkographs indicate a sequence of actions: Look commands followed by Move commands; Look and Move commands followed by Transfer commands; and finally, Look, Move, and Transfer followed by Execute commands. Whereas the PercentageOfLinks from Figure 4 and Table I illustrate the individual phases of activity, the sub-linkographs in Figure 5 (c) provide the dynamics of moving from one activity to another.
Just as with Figure 4 , finding the sub-linkographs with the highest value of PercentageOfLinks is insightful. Table II shows the sub-linkographs with at least three nodes and a PercentageOfLinks of at least 0.6. Included in this set are the sub-linkographs SL(3, 7), SL(9, 13), and SL (14, 18) , which roughly correspond to the manually identified sublinkographs. However, unlike Figure 4 , taking the maximal sub-linkographs is not as helpful since then one would only get SL(0, 7) and SL (9, 18) , which conflates the sub-linkographs and does not identify interesting transition points.
In order to further narrow our analysis, we must take into account the fact the links are not relating similar actions, but actions that led to subsequent ones. Since sublinkographs are based on how connected/related a node is to its predecessors, we consider the BackLinkPercent(a) metric, which gives the ratio of backlinks present versus the possible backlinks for node a. In order to identify nodes heavily dependent on previous actions, we only consider nodes where the BackLinkPercent is at least 0.7 as shown in Table III . This allows us to automatically identify the nodes 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 18, which are exactly the nodes that make up the previously manually-identified sub-linkographs SL(5, 7), SL (12, 13) , and SL(15, 18).
Once we have identified interest regions of the graph using the statistics provided by PercentageOfLinks and BackLinkPercent, we want to understand the transition between activities and the information encoded in these transitions. In order to achieve this, we use ShannonEntropy. 1.00 SL (9, 12) 1.00 SL (13, 16) 1.00 SL (15, 18) 1.00 Fig. 6 . Portion of a linkograph of cyber event data using only relations Look → Transfer and Move → Transfer. Table IV gives the sub-linkographs of Figure 5 (c) such that the ShannonEntropy is at least one 2 . We selected high entropy sub-linkographs due to previous research that demonstrated such areas indicate new idea generation and interesting behavioral patterns [11] , [15] . Of particular interest are the sub-linkographs SL(2, 5), SL (9, 12) , and SL (13, 16) . These sub-linkographs are all related to the previous sublinkographs in that each of the new sub-linkographs are the actions that resulted in the sub-linkographs identified using BackLinkPercent. Using the regions identified by the BackLinkPercent and further highlighted by ShannonEntropy, an analyst can quickly analyze critical transitions in the linkograph and attacker behavior.
V. HONEYCUE PLACEMENT Recent research has developed and deployed cyber defense tools such as honeypots, honeynets, and honeytokens (i.e., false flags) to confuse, slow, and detect cyber adversaries [22] - [24] . However, the placement of these defensive tools is typically agnostic of the patterns, goals, and interests of those adversaries. In Section IV, we analyzed information to further our understanding of an attacker. It was shown that the attacker followed a sequence of phases of Look, Move, Look, Transfer, Look, Execute, and Cleanup. Some meaning is also extracted by looking at sets of sub-linkographs to determine three primary sets of actions: 1) looking and then moving, 2) looking and then transferring, and 3) looking and executing. In this section, we demonstrate how LinkShop can be used to inform the placement of a special type of honeytoken we call a honeycue. A honeycue is a piece of information (e.g., file, symbolic link, etc.) designed to influence subsequent moves made by an attacker, therefore delaying or disrupting an attack.
Consider again the sub-linkograph SL(12, 13) in Figure 5(c) . This sub-linkograph is created by the commands Look and Move being followed by a Transfer. In the GrrCON data, these sub-linkographs are the result of looking at a sequence of progressively deeper directories and then downloading some information to the system. However, if we split the 'ftp' and 'scp' commands into an abstraction class Transfer, then the resulting sub-linkographs from the relations Look → Transfer and Move → Transfer measures the behavior of looking around and then taking information. An example of this behavior is shown in Figure 6 .
So how does this relate to honeycues? The idea is to look for patterns like Figure 6 and present a false file to the attacker after he or she has copied two or three files. After someone has already invested some trust in the files previously copied, they tend to be less critical of new information that is presented. Moreover, once someone has started to copy files, there is a tendency to want to copy more [25] . As in Section IV, the function BackLinkPercent can be used to identify the sub-linkographs where files are being transferred. Thus, the scheme is to construct linkographs based on the relations Look → Transfer and Move → Transfer. Identifying the times where the attacker is looking through files and transferring them allows for the opportunity to place a honeycue, particularly once a file has already been transferred.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, we have applied the concepts of Linkography to cyber security, providing a method for analyzing cyber event data. This includes formally defining a linkograph and a set of metrics used to quantitatively compare various attack linkographs. We created LinkShop, a complete framework for the automatic generation of linkographs from raw cyber event data that allows an analyst to quantitatively compare and assess events. LinkShop includes an abstraction model used to examine and aggregate actions taken by the attacker, allowing actions to be interpreted as a set of higher level categories that share common characteristics. LinkShop also uses an ontological model to describe the general form and flow of a cyber attack, providing the mechanism for correlating related abstracted actions. We demonstrated linkographs can be used to analyze the behavior of an attacker and draw subsequent conclusions from this behavior. We highlighted how the metrics can be used in automated fashion to identify linkograph regions and commands of interest. Finally, we discussed how linkography can be used to inform the placement of a honeycue designed to influence attacker behavior.
In future work, we will 1) expand our set of linkograph metrics, 2) investigate semantic transition rules, and 3) create meta-metrics over the linkographs. We will focus on metrics computed over complete linkographs, allowing for quick linkograph triage. The goal is to further enhance the information given to analysts, allowing not only effective intragraph but also intergraph comparison. Semantic transition rules can be added between classes without adding undue complexity and may further help distinguish the creative inflection points as well as enhance the visibility of forward progress. Such rules have shown promise in allowing for greater fidelity and flexibility in the link formation across the graph. Finally, the new metrics will allow for feature vectors that can be used in temporal analyses, outlier detection techniques, and learning networks to both identify and classify behaviors.
